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Joanna Latimer (SATSU, University of York) and Rolland Munro (University of Leicester) 
	
Our aim in this chapter is to open up issues around generalizing in social science research. 
We counter-point a tendency to evidence explanatory hypotheses through the adding up of 
ÔconfirmatoryÕ observations, with the radically different approach of arriving at 
understandings of Ôworld-makingÕ through sustained contemplation of the instance. What we 
are putting into question is the modernist insistence on attaching a valuation of ÔoneÕ to any 
incident or event: to denote an instance as merely a Ôspecific caseÕ, a Ôsingle exampleÕ, a 
Ôone-offÕ. This is not just because the one-off can be dismissed as irrelevant, to be treated as 
either something of little or no account or as the deviation that proves the rule. Rather, as 
ethnographers in two different fields, we both cherish the value of the exemplar, the moment, 
incident or instance that sums up what is going on and which seems to throw everything else 
into light. 
 One of the aporias of science is the multiplication of generalizations that are required 
to keep pace with the never-ending process of division within research. The analytic mode 
results in splitting phenomena, events and substance into ever-finer parts, a process that was 
supposedly put into reverse by the use of logic for its re-synthesis into meaningful theory. Yet 
as David Hume pointed out a century or so after Descartes revitalized interest in the 
analytical approach of the Greeks, logic is unable to add back the meaning that analysis has 
subtracted. This is because formal logic prohibits any move to generalize from the adding up 
of parts. While it is possible to begin with a universal like ÔredÕ and proceed to find examples 
that appear to have the quality of redness, no amount of observations of swans permits 
whiteness to be the essence of swans. 
 The subsequent implosion of knowledge in the West has thus entailed a loss in 
meaning, a loss that has gone hand in hand with the fashion for metrics: measurement having 
long since been employed to reinstate what logic fails to add back. Inevitably, however, since 
the potential for measurement multiplies as fast as division works its possibilities, meaning 
becomes a receding horizon. As Dave Beer (2016) argues, at work, in the body, and in leisure 
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and consumption, uncertainty grows apace with the pressure to measure everything. It is as if 
people are seeking stabilities in identities by bolstering the ever-growing detail of life with 
ever-greater refinements in terms of numbers. Whatever counts counts; and the story of 
attempts by colleagues at the University of Edinburgh seeking to remove Higgs (of Higgs 
Boson fame) from his post because of a lack of publications for the research audit is salutary 
for all those magnifying themselves by watching their citations grow on sites such as 
Research Gate. 
 Pressing questions remain, nonetheless, over how, and when, the single instance is 
admissible. This is an issue that dominates more popular debates about generalizability; and 
rightly so in the face of governmental policies being driven by demands for more and more 
quantitatively based evidence. Examples of older people being left unattended on hospital 
trolleys for hours should be shocking and unacceptable, but they should not be interpreted as 
meaning the NHS is a failing institution that must be privatized. So, too, the call for 
quantitative evidence also affects the politics of everyday life: while we might feel sympathy 
with a person who was bullied at school in ways that soured their later life, we can all feel 
irritated when someone draws too broadly on an unfortunate experience of their own, such as 
a failed marriage, to argue marriage should be avoided by everyone else. 
 This brings us back to HumeÕs problem of induction. The positivist movement, which 
arose in the late nineteenth century and gathered pace in the early twentieth century, 
attempted to get round the embargo on turning observations (ÔThis planet has life on itÕ) into 
law-like theories (ÔAll planets have life on themÕ) by a reversal in direction that insisted on all 
ÔmeaningfulÕ generalizations having to be stated in a theoretical form that permitted testable 
predictions to be drawn from them (ÔIf all planets travel in an ellipse, then the EarthÕs orbit is 
ellipticalÕ). This opened the way for Karl PopperÕs argument that, since science could never 
prove its law-like theories to be true, it had to look for contrary instances that falsified the 
theory. Indeed, increasing attention is now given to looking for the contrary case, the 
unpredictable outcome, as what has become popularized as Ôblack swansÕ (Taleb 2007). 
 World-making Ð in contrast to the illusion that there is a single, discernible universe 
Ôout thereÕ to which all pronouncements and propositions must refer Ð is directed towards 
knowing how each of us is drawing our ideas and experience together in ways that stabilize 
the Ôbuzzing, blooming confusionÕ. As Latour (1987) explains, what matters in science is not 
the truth of each single proposition, the conventional view about it, but whether or not things 
hold together more generally: 
A sentence does not hold together because it is true, but because it holds 
together we say it is ÔtrueÕ. But what does it hold onto? Many things. Why? 
Because it has tied its fate to anything at hand that is more solid than itself. As 
a result no one can shake it loose without shaking everything else. (p.101) 
 Attempts to name this most elusive of human phenomena vary: complementary to the 
idea of world-making, anthropologists attend to cultures as shaping ideas, mores and beliefs, 
Kuhn referred to paradigms as generating theories in science, while Foucault talked about 
truth regimes and explained how discourse could discipline thought. So, too, the less 
totalizing notions of perspective and standpoint have taken on an extra weight of meaning, 
with (the later) Goffman also identifying ÔframingÕ as exercising this kind of force. 
 The notion of world-making seems especially appropriate, therefore, for research in 
social science, where a key aim is to comprehend ways in which world-making is organizing 
what we or others are engaged in (Latimer and Munro 2015). Insofar as this requires a shift 
away from a focus on what we think, towards imputing what might be governing our thought, 
it might be that a more fecund alternative rests on the notion of working backwards. While a 
partial step towards this is captured in the pragmatist Charles PeirceÕs notion of abduction (a 
method distinct from induction and deduction in its positioning of generalizing as a heuristic), 
the roots of its more profound influence are to be found in Heidegger. Instead of finding 
himself always looking for ÔsomethingÕ, asking say if it existed or not, HeideggerÕs (1959) 
deconstruction of metaphysics proceeded by questioning and re-questioning ÔWhy is there 
always something?Õ In persisting in his contemplation of this single question, he was 
eventually able to break open the stranglehold that Western metaphysics imposed on the 
existence/non-existence of things and ask the very different question ÔWhy is there 
something, rather than nothing?Õ 
 In reversing the usual mode of direction of generalizing, researchers in social science 
can ask: What are the conditions of possibility for a particular event to have taken place? This 
is to wonder: Can we re-visualize the world to make sense of what someone has done? Or 
ask: What kind of moral order would permit a person to engage in head-hunting (Rosaldo 
1993)? This kind of questioning would also encompass coming to understand the very 
absence of events; for example, as Mary Douglas (1975: 4) noted, allowing a menstruating 
woman to cook would cause the cosmos of the Lele to collapse. Consider Marilyn StrathernÕs 
(1999) ÔglimpseÕ of men half-running, with their path out of her field of vision: 
On my part, I shall never forget my first sight of mounted pearl shells in Mt 
Hagen, in 1964, heavy in their resin boards, slung like pigs on a pole being 
carried between two men, who were hurrying with them because of the 
weight, a gift of some kind. (p.8) 
 As Strathern says, she will never forget this image Ð the ÔdazzleÕ of what she saw 
stayed with her over decades. Yet what is the status of such a ÔglimpseÕ? Strathern (1999: 6) 
argues that seeing the men half-running with the weight of the mounted pearl shells Ð and it 
would prove that it had to be men because only men could offer this kind of gift since women 
were not allowed to handle pearl shells Ð was for her an ethnographic moment. For Strathern 
it was the relation that joined ÔimmersionÕ in the field of observation (concrete apprehension 
of facts) with ÔmovementÕ in the field of writing (abstract analysis). As she notes, ÔWhat 
makes the ethnographic moment is the way in which these activities are apprehended as 
occupying the same (conceptual) spaceÕ (1999: 262). 
 Addressing the particular can also be an approach that constitutes the instance as an 
ÔeventÕ (Deleuze 1992): an irruption, bifurcation, a moment of irreducible dissonance, a 
transition that opens. We can note, then, when and how an account or a performance is 
treated Goffman-like (1963) as ÔinfractionÕ or even as one of GarfinkelÕs (1996) ÔbreachesÕ. 
Such moments can indicate what is held by some participants to be most precious in the 
culture concerned; and so work to preserve, or even intensify, the sacredness of what may 
ÔpassÕ as acceptable and what may not. Alternatively, their value might also lie in their 
instantiating a moment of resistance, a moment in which the usual modes of ordering and 
backgrounding suddenly let the implicit come into view, including all that makes the truth 
hold. 
 So particulars need not be about representing through discounting specifics into 
numerals (or their verbal equivalents: one, many, most). This brings us back to the question 
of how does a Strathern make their examples trustworthy? As revealing something, rather 
than saying nothing? There is, to be sure, value in the ÔsurpriseÕ finding, the contrary example 
that puts into doubt all that has been known before. But the true value of the illuminating 
example comes not only from evading the trap of making the example hold as a particular 
ÔrepresentationÕ of a universal truth or Ôsocial factÕ, or from the rigour of the researcherÕs 
cross-checks and balances alone.  
Good examples are much more profound: they are about grounding the part in the 
fabric of relations and associations, connections and disconnections that makes the particular 
possible. For example, the particular of what Riles (1998) calls Ôa figure seen twiceÕ is about 
bringing into the light the conditions in which the figure is being made possible. This is why 
Bauman (1989) is opposed to naming men like Hitler or Stalin as ÔmonstersÕ. As he suggests, 
such easy nomenclature overlooks how the mores of administrative theory shape and 
ÔadiaphoriseÕ social relations in ways that enable the effacement of particular forms of 
personhood, and heinous acts to be carried out. The division of labour into specialist roles 
ensures that those who gather the names have no direct relation to the soldiers who put the 
people on the trains; with neither having any connection to the guards who run the camps or 
the people (sometimes prisoners themselves) who are given the task of pressing prisoners into 
the gas chambers. 
 The notion of world-making is also highly germane to interdisciplinary research. 
Inasmuch as proliferating specialization through the division of labour governs the growth of 
knowledge, it also affects the methods by which researchers from different schools or 
traditions can come together and collaborate. In this respect, it is not only the world-making 
of those being studied that should be the focus of research in attempting to understand what 
the devil it is they are up to. By the same token, researchers are encouraged today to be more 
reflexive about their own orientations and pre-judgements. This kind of exemplification is 
unfolded by Helen Verran (2001) in her description of the disconcertment she felt in Nigerian 
classrooms when observing one of her student Nigerian teachers conducting maths and 
science classes: the intense feeling that something in someone elseÕs world-making is out of 
order, a sense that opens up the possibility of a different kind of world-making and confounds 
any possibility of a generalizing logic. 
 Certainly, this opening up of different kinds of world-making becomes a pressing 
concern in collaborative projects that draw together researchers from diverse disciplines and 
different countries. And, critically, attention to this issue can promote collaboration, dialogics 
and mutual reflexivity. Indeed, rather than take the positive road of looking to make 
predictions on the basis that there could be a robust general theory for different cultures, it is 
almost now a commonplace to attend to the possibility of multiple worlds, multiple logics, 
multiple identities. Yet attempts to generalize about the diversity of what is underpinning 
thought and action may not entirely allow for a different kind of multiplicity in world-
making. This is to remember that extension takes place through relations of all types. Hence 
world-making not only takes place within the connections people make as they interpret 
things and relate ideas to their experience, worlds also get shaped and pre-figured within 
boardrooms of power and behind the scenes in clandestine meetings among people of 
influence. As such it seems preferable to assume that such matters as Zeitgeist, belief systems 
and perspective only contribute to world-making, but never act alone. 
 Ahead of closing, therefore, we want to go one step further and press another facet to 
generalizing that even these more radical forms of research overlook. As authors we have 
taken care to introduce into our own research the notion of motility (Munro 1996; Latimer 
2013), allowing people to be much more motile, both in the self they perform and in the 
worlds they endlessly construct. So rather than identifying how many people act or speak in 
accordance with institutionalized routines and repetitions, or deviate in well-trodden ways, 
we have tried to explicate how switches in extension take place from moment to moment. 
Extension here could include attachment to tools, narrative tropes, situations, or involve other 
persons. Importantly these materials of extension body-forth specific meanings, ways of 
seeing or doing the world, by people as they go about their everyday lives. Such switches in 
extension thus alter the world, even if only momentarily or fractionally, and do so without 
disposing of existing or alternative possibilities, as is implied by concepts such as mutation 
and evolution. 
 Indeed, the potential to exercise motility may underpin power relations. Our drawing 
attention to how different worlds are kept in play, therefore, is not simply to point to the 
making and unmaking of identities (and worlds) as fluid (as if anything goes). On the 
contrary, our emphasis on motility is to help researchers attend to how, when and where 
switches in extension take place. Noting such matters helps illuminate the complexity at stake 
in how, when and where stabilities are being accomplished and re-accomplished. This is to 
adduce the precise moments and places when switches are made, including identifying how 
motility can become commonplace in accomplishing power relations at work (Munro 1999). 
And it is through this attention to how people and things become attached and detached that 
the stabilities or ÔconditionsÕ underpinning world-making can not only be made visible, but 
observed to change from time to time however momentarily. For example, Latimer (2013) in 
her study of the partial alignment of medicine and the new genetics, helps reveal how medical 
dominance is accomplished and re-accomplished not through purification, or the enactment 
of the scientific method alone, but also through switches in extension. In terms of motility 
sustaining medicineÕs dominance, those practising medicine can be observed to switch their 
attachment Ð at one moment they perform the medical gaze as a pure clinical moment 
through which people and their parts are objectified, in the next they reattach to persons as 
human beings. 
 In emphasizing these different facets of world-making, we have contested the 
orientation to generalize along a single line of investigation, severing relations in order to add 
up specific examples that are taken to be similar in one way or another. To generalize in 
social science requires researchers to remain open to the manifold of relations and the far-
reaching possibilities in world-making that connection (and disconnection) may take. So let 
us ask again: What value can we give the particular? Should we treat the exception as 
idiosyncratic, merely reinforcing the case for the normal by limiting their value to a form of 
deviance? Or do such matters draw attention instead to how people and their worlds are 
ÔmotileÕ Ð not only in manifesting different identities as they say or do things, but in 
effortlessly shifting their world-making from moment to moment as they alter their habits and 
routines from place to place? 
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